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Abstract 
Building on the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf, (1984) and Myers (1984), 
the present study empirically analyses the association between the board of directors’ 
composition and firm financing policies. Particularly, the fraction of independent 
directors on the board, the fraction of female directors, the board size, and whether the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the board are analysed. It is 
conjectured that a more independent and efficient board leads to a shift of financing 
choices from retained earnings to short term debt, from short term debt to long term 
debt and from long term debt to external equity financing. The results obtained strongly 
support this hypothesis. Policy implications are then derived. 
Keywords: board of directors; independent directors; corporate governance; capital 
structure. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the Modigliani and Miller (1958) seminal paper that many studies attempt to 
explain the capital structure used by corporations to finance their investments. One 
prominent line of research is the pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984). This theory argues that because of adverse selection costs, firms have an 
order of preference in the use of their financing sources. The theory predicts that firms 
prefer to use retained earnings over debt, short-term debt over long-term debt and debt 
over equity. This pecking order arises from information asymmetries between managers 
and outside investors. 
 In this study we analyse the effect of the board of directors’ composition on the 
firm pecking order. We conjecture that a more independent and effective board of 
directors increases the quality and quantity of information provided by insiders to the 
public and therefore reduce the adverse selection costs considered by the pecking order 
theory. To test this hypothesis we analyse the effect of the board of directors’ features 
on the different sources of financing. That is, the research question here addressed asks 
whether the board of directors’ composition has an influence on the pecking order of 
financing sources.  
Given that less information asymmetry leads to less use of retained earnings, the 
impact of having a more independent board on the use of equity can be difficult to 
assess, since retained earnings is part of the firm’s equity. To address this problem the 
present study analyses the effect of board composition on external equity and internal 
generated equity (i.e. retained earnings). Further, since the pecking order predicts that if 
debt capital is needed firms should use short term debt rather than long term we 
segregate the firm sources of financing into retained earnings, short term debt and long 
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term debt. We then analyse the effect of board of directors’ composition on each one of 
the financing sources. 
 After controlling for a wide set of control variables, the results of the empirical 
investigation strongly support the proposed hypothesis. Particularly, it is found that a 
larger fraction of independent directors on the board leads the firm to use more external 
financing sources and shift from short term debt to long term debt and from long term 
debt to external equity. The results also provide some evidence that a more gender 
diversified board of directors and where the chairman is non-executive can lead the firm 
to rely more on long term sources of financing. The results are robust to a number of 
specifications and robustness tests. 
 This study extends the empirical work on the effect of corporate governance on 
capital structure in three main ways. First, while the majority of the studies that relate 
corporate governance and capital structure focus on aggregated corporate governance 
data, the present study focus on particular attributes of the board of directors structure, 
namely the total number of independent directors, the fraction of female directors, the 
board size and if the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the board of 
directors. This focused analysis is important because many of the aggregated indices 
may include governance devices that are both beneficial to shareholders and to the 
bondholders as is the case of the antitakeover devices (Bradley and Chen, 2011). 
Second, since the pecking order theory have different empirical implications in regard 
to different types of financing sources, this study analyses the effect of board structure 
on the fraction of retained earnings, external equity, short-term debt and long-term debt. 
Finally, this study provides new insights on the determinants of capital structure and 
adds to the discussion over capital structure theories. 
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 The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the 
capital structure literature and the literature addressing the effect of board composition 
on capital structure is reviewed and the main hypothesis developed. In section 3 the data 
and the methodology is presented. The results are presented and discussed in section 4 
and section 5 concludes with policy implications of the findings. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In this section we briefly review the main theoretical theories and previous empirical 
studies relating to capital structure and corporate governance. These theoretical and 
empirical studies will then be used to frame the hypothesis stated subsequently. 
2.1. Literature review 
Capital structure theory can be divided in two main lines of thought: (1) the trade-off 
theory and the (2) pecking-order theory. Although not contrasting, these theories can 
predict different management behaviours in relation to financing choices, particularly, 
in relation to the effect of board of directors’ composition on those choices. Since these 
theories are commonly discussed in the corporate finance literature, we will be brief on 
the exposition. For a thorough and relative recent theoretical and empirical discussion of 
both the trade-off and the pecking order theories refer to Myers (2003) and Frank and 
Goyal (2008). 
2.1.1. Trade-off theory 
The trade-off theory suggests that firms will target for an optimal level of mix between 
equity and debt that maximizes the difference between the benefits and costs of issuing 
debt. The benefit of debt is the tax advantage of interest payments to debt holders 
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(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977). Since interest is tax deductible, firms have 
incentives to use more debt. The costs of debt are generally described as financial 
distressed costs. These costs include the costs of bankruptcy (Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973) and agency costs of financial distress (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The costs of bankruptcy include the direct costs (e.g. legal and administrative 
expenses) and the indirect costs of bankruptcy. These indirect costs are characterized by 
the reduction in value of the firm assets over the bankruptcy process (e.g. loss of 
business with clients that demand guaranties of business continuity from their 
suppliers). Beyond these bankruptcy costs, the costs that arise from the conflicts of 
interest between equity holders and debt holders must also be taken into account in this 
trade-off theory. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) show, managers can change the 
riskiness of their investments after issuing debt. Motivated by the fact that equity can be 
viewed as a call option, in which its value appreciates as the risk of the underlying asset 
increases (Merton, 1973), managers acting on the interest of equity holders can be 
tempted to shift the risk of their operations at the cost of the creditors. This behaviour is 
often labelled as “the asset substitution problem”. Notwithstanding, rational debt 
holders are aware of that possibility and therefore, write debt contracts (including 
monitoring devices) to prevent managers to shift the firms’ assets risk and/or demand 
higher premiums for buying debt. In either case, as shown by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), the entire costs are incurred by the shareholders and the more debt the firm uses 
the higher the likelihood of incurring financial distress costs. The trade-off theory then 
argues that firms will aim at some target level leverage so that the firm value is 
maximized (i.e. where the marginal costs of debt use match the marginal benefits). 
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2.1.2. Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) argue that 
because of adverse selection costs, firms have an order of preference in the use of their 
financing sources. The theory builds on asymmetric information problems between 
managers and outside investors. Since managers know more about the company 
prospects than outside investors, when facing new valuable investment opportunities 
managers may pass them up if external financing is needed. The rational for this 
behaviour is that investors (who have less information than managers) infer the true 
value of the firm from the manager willingness to issue equity. Investors interpret a new 
equity issue rationally and read it as bad news and only accept to buy new equity at a 
discount price. Because issuing new equity at lower prices might transfer value from 
current shareholders to new shareholders managers do not issue new equity and pass up 
an investment opportunity that would increase the firm value.  
In this scope (where internal agents know more about the firm than do outsiders) 
internal financing sources allow managers to always go ahead with new valuable 
investment opportunities. Further, if debt is available and risk free, than it can also be 
used. If debt is available and risky, then Myers (1984) argues intuitively that it is 
preferable to equity, since it is less sensible to adverse selection costs. In other words, 
the adverse selection premium demanded by investors is lower for less risky securities. 
Therefore, because of these information asymmetries, the pecking order theory predicts 
that if capital is needed for new investment opportunities firms prefer to use retained 
earnings over debt, short-term debt over long-term debt and debt over equity. 
One key difference between the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory is 
that in the most extreme interpretation of the pecking order theory managers do not have 
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a well-defined target leverage ratio, while in the trade-off theory it is predicted that 
management will issue debt or equity towards a target leverage ratio (Myers, 1984). A 
critique that is often pointed to the pecking order theory is that in its most extreme 
interpretation companies should never issue equity, provided that it is always possible to 
issue debt. Pecking order advocates then argue that because firms have some limit debt 
capacity, the debt capacity serves to limit the amount of debt within the pecking order 
and in fact allows for the use of equity (Lemmon and Zender, 2010). Although, neither 
the trade-off theory or the pecking order theory can explain all the stylized facts 
encountered in the real life (Frank and Goyal, 2008, 2009), empirical literature has 
frequently documented that managers behave like the pecking order theory predicts, 
even if they have in mind some sort of flexible target leverage ratio (e.g. Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989); Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama and French, 2002; Brounen et 
al., 2006; Lemmon and Zender, 2010). 
2.1.3. Other factors that can influence capital structure 
Although the trade-off and the pecking order are the main theories explaining how firms 
choose their financing structures, other forces can influence that structure. Jensen 
(1986) posits that the use of debt can mitigate the agency costs that arise from conflicts 
of interest between managers and shareholders. The intuition is that managers of firms 
that generate substantial cash-flows are more likely to be entrenched, tempted to 
overinvest and consume perquisites. The use of debt ties managers to pay out future 
cash flows, reducing the cash flow available for spending at their discretion and 
increases organizational efficiency. As such, in line with the trade-off theory, debt has 
this additional benefit: reducing agency costs between managers and equity holders. In a 
different line, Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that firms decide whether to issue equity 
or repurchase it depending on equity market values, creating what it is commonly 
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labelled as the market timing hypothesis. Alti (2006) tested this market timing 
hypothesis and found that the negative effect of timing equity issues on financial 
leverage quickly reverses. This reversion happens because it is likely that when issuing 
overvalued equity it is also likely that debt is also overvalued and firms issue more debt.    
2.1.4. Corporate governance and financing structure 
Turning now to the effect of corporate governance devices on capital structure 
decisions, empirical researchers have only recently devoted more attention to this 
subject. A line of research has focused on the relation between aggregated corporate 
governance metrics and the use of total equity versus total debt. John and Litov (2010) 
and Jiraporn et al. (2012) are two examples of this approach. These two studies find that 
firms whose managers are more entrenched (with poor governance mechanisms) are 
significantly more leveraged. These authors then argue that debt and governance play 
the same role and may substitute for each other. Contrasting with these results, Harford 
and Zhao (2008), using an index of board directors characteristics find that ‘stronger’ 
boards (more independent boards) will force the firm to hold more debt and more short-
term. 
In a similar approach, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) analyse family controlled firms 
and find that these firms have higher debt levels and lower levels of board independence 
compared to non-family firms, suggesting that debt is a substitute for independent 
directors. Consistent with these results, Ghosh et al. (2011) find that firms with 
entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debt. They argue that managers 
acting in their own self-interest will choose lower leverage to reduce liquidity risk and 
use short maturity debt to preserve their ability to enhance their compensation and 
reputations by empire building.  
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 A related stream of literature analyses how corporate governance mechanisms 
affect the cost of debt. Klock et al. (2005), Bradley and Chen (2011), Lorca et al. (2011) 
and Fields et al. (2012) are some examples of this line of research. Klock et al. (2005) 
find that antitakeover governance provisions (that provides strongest management 
rights) lower the cost of debt financing. In other words, there is a positive association 
between governance quality and the cost of capital. Consistent with this result, Bradley 
and Chen (2011) argue that managerial self-serving behaviour (entrenchment) may not 
be detrimental to bondholders as they adopt low-risk, self-serving operating strategies, 
which coincidentally redound to the benefit of corporate bondholders. Conversely, 
Lorca et al. (2011) and Fields et al. (2012) find that firms that have higher quality 
boards (with a greater advisory presence) contribute to a reduction in the agency cost of 
debt financing. They argue that the board of directors monitoring role leads to a 
decrease in the opportunistic behaviour of managers and information asymmetry, with 
the consequent reduction of creditors’ perception of likelihood of default in loan 
repayments, which results in a lower cost of debt. These two contrasting results may be 
originated from the fact that antitakeover provisions affect the cost of debt in an 
opposing way to the board of directors’ independence and effectiveness effect. 
Antitakeover provisions are detrimental to equity but beneficial to bond holders (due to 
the to the coinsurance effect associated with acquisitions (Bradley and Chen, 2011)), 
whereas board of directors’ independence is beneficial to both equity and bondholders 
(since it reduces information asymmetry (Fields et al. (2012)). 
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2.2. Hypothesis  
Following the pecking order theory it is clear that information asymmetry problems 
between the firm and capital providers are important determinants of financing choices. 
Since different funds providers have different access to relevant information about the 
firm and different ability to monitor firm behaviour, firms care about who provides the 
funds (MacKie-Mason, 1990). Because information asymmetry between managers and 
investors increases the difficulty of issuing securities, particularly public equity and 
debt securities, it creates a natural preference for managers to use internal over external 
financing.  
The pecking order theory predicts that the lower the information asymmetry 
between management and public investors the less costly is to issue securities.  Firms 
within which information asymmetry is great should use more internal generated funds 
and if needed issue the less risky securities, such as short-term debt to avoid issuing 
securities at higher discount, such as long-term debt and/or equity. Among the external 
financing sources managers would prefer less risky securities, since high risk securities 
(such as new equity and long term debt), are more sensitive to information asymmetries 
than the low risk ones such as short-term debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
A more independent and diversified board of directors is expected to decrease 
information asymmetries between managers and investors and therefore should make it 
easier to issue external securities and risky securities. The reason is that outside 
financing requires managers to explain to outside investors the need for the funds and 
therefore expose themselves to investor monitoring if they want to get best price for the 
securities. Entrenched and self-serving managers dislike this process and would prefer 
retained earnings over external financing (Frank and Goyal, 2008). A board of directors 
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composed in such a way that it reduces information asymmetries between managers and 
potential investors should make it easier to issue external finance, and within this type 
the more risky securities. In other words, one should see a shift between internal and 
external financing choices, and from less risky securities (e.g. short-term debt) to more 
risky securities (e.g. long-term debt and new equity) when the board of directors can act 
as a mechanism of reducing information asymmetries between insiders and external 
investors. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The board of directors’ composition influences the firm financing mix, 
such as retained earnings, external equity, short term debt and long term debt. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
This study builds on a sample of firms extracted from Bloomberg data base. This data 
vendor provides market, accounting and corporate governance data from a wide set of 
listed firms across the world. The initial data sample consists of all nonfinancial firms 
with both financial and corporate governance data available between 2006 and 2010. 
We select this time period because this data vendor only provides corporate governance 
data for a wide set of firms from 2006 onwards. Selecting a longer time window would 
significantly reduce the total number of firms in the initial sample. Financial firms are 
excluded because they are subject to specific capital requirement regulations that can 
potentially influence their financing choices (Alves and Ferreira, 2011). The initial 
sample results in 2,427 firms (12,135 observations) from 33 countries. Column (1) and 
(2) of table 1 provides a description of sample data over the various countries. Similar 
to other capital structure studies (e.g. Alves and Ferreira, 2011) our sample is composed 
with roughly 50% of firms from the US and Japan. 
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«insert Table 1 approximately here» 
3.1. Dependent Variables 
This paper hypothesis posits that a firm board of directors’ composition affects the mix 
of financing sources. Particularly, it is argued that a board composed in such a way that 
reduces information asymmetries between management and investors makes it more 
likely for the firm to use external sources of funds and, among these, the more risky 
ones. To test this hypothesis we segregate the firm financing sources into four different 
levels according to the predicted hierarchy of the pecking order. First, following Myers 
(1984), we segregate equity into internal and external, one at the top of the pecking 
order and one at the bottom. Further, in a similar way of Baker and Wurgler (2002) we 
define internal equity as the book value of retained earnings (RE) and book external 
equity (BEE) as the total book value of equity minus retained earnings. Finally, we 
segregate the firm debt into short-term-debt (STD) and long-term debt (LTD), where 
STD is the book value of current liabilities due within one year minus accounts payable 
and LTD is defined as the total book value of non-current liabilities (liabilities not due 
to be paid within the next year). Each of these four types of financing sources is then 
scaled by the total book value of capital employed (book capital), which is defined as 
the book value of assets less accounts payable as in Rajan and Zingales (1995). By this 
means the total book capital is segregated in four types of financing sources and they 
sum up to one: (1) Book EE, defined as BEE divided by book capital; (2) Book RE, 
defined as RE divided by book capital; (3) Book STD, defined as STD divided by book 
capital; (4) Book LTD defined as LTD divided by book capital. 
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In addition, each of the four abovementioned types of financing is also computed 
as quasi-market values. To be consistent with the book measures, the market value of 
external equity (MEE) is defined as the market value of equity minus the book value of 
retained earnings. The other three measures (RE, STD and LTD) are computed the same 
way. Then, each one is divided by the quasi market value of capital (market capital), 
which is computed as the book value of total capital less the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity. As with the book values of financing sources, these quasi 
market values also sum up to one. (1) Market EE, defined as MEE divided by market 
capital; (2) Market RE, defined as RE divided by market capital; (3) Market STD, 
defined as STD divided by market capital; and (4) Market LTD, defined as LTD divided 
market capital. In sum, we end up with eight measures of financing sources, four 
measures computed as book values and other four measures valued as quasi market 
values (where the book value of equity is replaced by the market value of equity): 
Finally, we have winsorised each of these measures, using the bottom and the top 1% of 
the variables distribution tails in order to avoid potential erroneous data. Columns (3) to 
(6) of table 1 present these four quasi market-value financing sources for the various 
countries in the sample. Overall, the fraction of market external equity yields up to 
43.2% which represents the highest fraction of all financing sources. The second most 
used source of finance is long term debt, followed by short-term debt and then by 
retained earnings. This ranking varies widely across countries. For instance, in Japan 
retained earnings is the most representative financing source and represent on average 
32.3% of total capital. On the other hand, in Australia external equity represents 71.8% 
of the total capital and retained earnings are negative, probably revealing that Australian 
firms in this sample pay out most of its positive profits and when capital is needed (e.g. 
when having negative profits) they issue external equity.  
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3.2. Independent variables 
We are interested is learning if the board structure affects management decisions in 
terms financing choices. We predict that a board of directors that reduces information 
asymmetries between management and outside investors would lead to a financing mix 
with more external financing and more risky securities. One feature that has received 
major attention from researchers is the board of directors’ independence, or in other 
words, the percentage of directors considered to be outside directors or not related with 
internal managers (executives) and its effect on reducing agency costs between agents 
(executive managers) and shareholders (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998, 2003). 
Within this scope, several research studies have found that firms with better 
corporate governance devices have better information disclosures and less information 
asymmetry problems (e.g. Vafeas, 2000; Klein, 2002; Beekes et al., 2004; Ajinkya et 
al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Petra, 2007; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010). For example, Ajinkya 
(2005) finds that firms with more outside directors’ issue forecast earnings more 
frequently, more specific, accurate and less optimistically biased. Similarly, 
Kanagaretnam et al (2007) report that firms with more independent boards of directors 
have lower information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements. The 
intuition is that the board of directors is responsible for monitoring the quality of the 
information contained in financial reports and provided to the shareholders and, 
therefore boards that do a more effective job of monitoring management enhance the 
quality and the frequency of public information released by the executive management. 
We therefore expect a positive relationship between the fraction of outsiders and the use 
of more risky securities in its financing structure.  
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 There are also several studies that address the effect of gender diversity on the 
corporate boards’ efficiency. Carter et al. (2003, 2010) suggest that board diversity can 
improve its monitoring efficiency. In a similar view, Kang et al. (2010) find a positive 
reaction from investors to women director appointments. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
document that female directors attend more to the board meetings, which is the primary 
way by which important monitoring information is gathered, suggesting that gender-
diverse boards allocate more effort to monitor the executive directors. Based on this 
argument we expect a more gender diversified board of directors to be more efficient 
and thus to contribute to lower information asymmetries. 
 With respect to board size, its effect on information asymmetry can be 
ambiguous. Yermack (1996) claim that larger boards are less efficient in monitoring 
management, arguing that coordination, communication and decision making can be 
more burdensome in large boards, thus, making the monitoring role of the board less 
effective. Consistent with this view, Vafeas (2000) and Ahmed et al. (2006) research 
document that earnings of firms with smaller boards are perceived by investors as being 
more informative. However, more recently, Coles et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
complex firms, which have greater advising requirements than simple firms, have larger 
boards and for these firms board effectiveness is positively associated with its size. 
Results from Peasnell et al. (2005) reveal that firms with larger boards are less likely to 
be associated with earnings management measured by abnormal accruals. These authors 
suggest that larger boards contribute towards the integrity of financial statements. 
Further, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) provide evidence that board of directors’ size is 
positively associated with the level of firm voluntary disclosure. Moreover, a larger 
board can also reflect dispersed ownership of the firm (as opposed with family 
controlled firms) which in turn can positively affect the quantity and quality of 
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information provided to the public (Chau and Gray, 2002). Therefore, whether board 
size increases or decreases information asymmetries between managers and the public is 
an empirical question. Hence, we are not able to predict a sign for the association 
between board size and the firm financing choices. 
 Within the same scope, Klein (2002) suggests that boards structured to be more 
independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial 
accounting process. In this sense, a board of directors where the chairman of the board 
is also the CEO should be less independent because of high concentration of power and 
adverse conditions for outsiders to effectively monitor the executive members (Coles et 
al., 2008; Duchin et al., 2010). Consistent with this view, Gul and Leung (2004) show 
that CEO duality is associated with lower voluntary disclosures firms. As such, firms 
with a chairman of the board that is simultaneously the CEO should face larger 
information asymmetries and we expect these firms to use less risky sources of 
financing. 
 Following the preceding discussion the independent variables considered in this 
study are: (i) the percentage of outside independent directors, measured as the ratio 
between the number of independent directors as reported by the company and number 
of directors on the firm’s board (% independent); (ii) the percentage of female directors 
measured as the ratio between the number of women and number of directors on the 
firm’s board (% women); (iii) the board size which is the logarithm of the total number 
of directors on the firm’s board (Log(board size)). If the company has supervisory and 
management boards, this is the total members of the supervisory board; (iv) a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
(CEO/Chair duality). 
17 
 
3.3. Control variables 
We include several control variables that are shown in prior studies to have significant 
impact on financing choices (e.g. Titman and Wessel, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). First, we control for growth opportunities, because of the 
asset the substitution problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the 
underinvestment problem identified by Myers (1977). Firms with higher opportunities 
to growth are more able to shift the risk of their assets and benefit shareholders at the 
cost of bondholders. In a similar way, firms with new valuable investment opportunities 
may pass them up if it leads to a reduction on the risk of assets that would benefit 
bondholders. The asset substitution and underinvestment problems can have influence 
on the firm financing choices, particularly for firms with higher growth opportunities 
and highly leveraged (Brounen et al., 2006; Alves and Ferreira, 2011).  
 We use two proxies for growth opportunities; the first is the average growth rate 
of the firm sales (Sales growth) as in Mande et al. (2010). The second is the value of 
investment in research and development (R&D) scaled by the firm total assets (R&D to 
assets) as in Johnson (2003) and Brown et al. (2009). We use these proxies for growth 
opportunities as opposed to the market-to-book ratio for three reasons. First, the market-
to-book indicator measures not only growth opportunities but also the degree of 
information asymmetry between management and investors. In fact a firm with a high 
value of market-to-book may indicate that it has valuable growth opportunities but also 
that have less agency problems. This is important for this study because this lower level 
of information asymmetry may steam from a more independent board of directors. 
Including market-to-book as a control variable could result in collinearity between this 
variable and the board structure variables. Secondly, the relation between market-to-
book ratio and financing sources may reflect the fact that managers time their equity 
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issues (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). This is also important in the present study because 
managers may time their equity issues when their shares are overvalued, and this 
overvaluation may also reflect the effect of having a more independent board. Finally, 
as explained in Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Johnson (2003) the relation between 
market-to-book and market measures of leverage can be mechanical, rather than 
reflecting the effect of growth opportunities on financing choices. For example, when 
regressing market leverage (measured as the book value of debt over the market value 
of capital) on market-to-book ratio, the market value of the firm is on the numerator of 
the dependent variable and also on the denominator of the independent variable. 
 Tax-shields are also important determinants of firms’ capital structure 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Many studies on the determinants of capital structure 
have recognized their importance in explaining financing choices (e.g. Huang and Song, 
2006; Brounen et al., 2006). The effective tax rate (Tax rate) measured as the total of 
corporate income taxes paid divided by the pre-tax profit is then used as a control 
variable. Effective tax rate is censored to be between zero and one. 
 Firm size has also been identified by capital structure literature as one of the 
main determinants of financing mix (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2009). Larger firms are 
more likely to be diversified and thus less likely to default on their debt provisions. 
Accordingly, larger firms may issue more debt than smaller firms. Therefore, we expect 
size to be positively related to leverage. Further, although larger firms tend to issue 
more information, they can be more complex and relevant information more difficult to 
read by investor. We therefore include the logarithm of sales (Log(Sales)) as a proxy for 
firm size as an additional control variable. 
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 DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) emphasize that non-debt related corporate tax 
shields like tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits may affect 
leverage. Such non-debt tax shields are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt. To 
address this determinant we follow Huang and Song (2006) and use depreciation and 
amortization over assets as a control variable to measure this kind of non-debt tax shield 
(Depreciation to assets). 
 In Williamson (1988), assets redeployability is a determinant of capital structure 
choices. In his scope, the assets specificity of firms determines the best type of 
financing sources to be employed. For firms where asset specificity is great (and less 
redeployable) equity financing should be used, since equity enables management 
oversight by the board of directors and, if financed with debt,  debt holders would bear 
higher risks (less protection in case of liquidation) and demand higher rates of return. 
On the other hand, for firms with highly redeployable assets, debt financing should be 
the preferred source of finance since it limits management discretion to a more bounded 
behaviour. Further, Williamson (1988) argues that although not identical, tangibility and 
redeployability are highly correlated. Campello and Giambona (2010), and Alves and 
Ferreira (2011) empirically observe a strong positive relationship between tangibility 
and firm leverage, corroborating Williamson (1988) predictions. As such, the present 
study also employs a control variable for assets tangibility, measured as the ratio of 
fixed assets over total assets (Tangibility). 
 Operating profitability, measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to book value of total assets (Return on assets 
(ROA)) is also included as a control variable. If firms prefer internal generate funds to 
finance their investment needs, firms with higher levels of profitability can have 
potentially higher levels of retained earnings, despite of the information asymmetry 
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problems. Moreover, firms with a more independent board of directors can also be more 
profitable. Thus, profitability is included as a control variable to extract any of these 
potential confounding effects. Additionally, we also include operating earnings 
volatility as an additional control variable, since firms with higher operating income 
volatility have higher operating risk and more likely to default (Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
This measure is computed for each firm as the standard deviation of its operating profit 
over the sample period (Sigma (ROA)). 
Country specific control variables are also included in the analysis. Following 
Kayo and Kimura (2011) we use the market capitalization to GDP ratio as a proxy to 
stock markets level of development (Log(Market cap to GDP)). Following Alves and 
Ferreira (2011) we also include a proxy for creditor rights measured as an index that 
ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that these countries bankruptcy laws 
protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending (legal rights 
indicator). Both indicators were obtained from World Bank data base. Several of the 
variables used were logarithmized to account for skewness in the data. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics on the variables used in this study. 
«insert Table 2 approximately here» 
3.4. Methodology 
To test the effect of board of directors’ composition on different financing sources, we 
employ a panel data model of the following baseline form: 
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where the index i denotes a firm, t denotes a year, financing source is one of the eight 
measures of financing sources use by firms, % of independent is the fraction of 
independent directors on the board of directors, % female is the fraction of female 
directors on the board of directors, board size is the logarithm of the total number of 
directors on the board, CEO/Duality is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the chairman of the board is also de CEO and control variable is the set of control 
variables defined above. This baseline specification includes year- and industry-fixed 
effects. The industry effects are captured using Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) sectors developed by and Standard & Poor's. 
We include industry fixed effects as opposed to firm fixed effects for two 
reasons. First, including firm fixed effects requires variation within firms across time in 
the variables of interest, which here are the fraction of independent and female 
directors, the board size and a dummy for the CEO/Chairman duality. Although these 
variables are not strictly constant over time for all firms, they are in fact time invariant 
for the majority of firms. Over the sample period (2006 to 2010) many firms may have 
constant fractions of independent and female directors and even more likely to have a 
constant dummy for the dummy variable CEO/Chairman duality. By estimating the 
parameters of equation (1) with firm fixed effects, the effects associated with the 
variables that are time invariant for those specific firms are not taken into account. As 
stressed by Wooldridge (2002, pg. 286) when key independent variables do not vary 
much over time, firm fixed effects (and in fact first differencing methods as well) can 
lead to imprecise estimates. John and Litov (2010) and Ghosh et al. (2011) also stress 
their inability to use firm fixed effects in this scope. Second, the capital structure 
literature has often documented that the firm industry is a major determinant of 
financing practices. For example, Frank and Goyal (2009) find evidence that firms in 
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industries in which the median leverage is high tend to have higher leverage, and that 
this is a core factor explaining leverage practices across firms. 
One potential problem of using industry rather than firm fixed effects or first 
differencing models is that it assumes exogeneity from independent variables (i.e. the 
error term in equation (1) is uncorrelated with the independent variables). We believe, 
however, that the board of directors’ composition variables and the financing sources 
variables are unlikely to be endogenously determined. Jiraporn et al. (2012) (following 
the arguments of Berger et al. (1997), Garvey and Hanka (1999), John and Litov (2009), 
among others), claim that there is no theoretical model in the literature suggesting the 
capital structure shocks cause changes in governance devices. Further, they argue that 
while capital structure decisions are defined by (executive) managers it is rather difficult 
for these managers to modify the firm's corporate governance devices. Therefore, our 
baseline model is estimated assuming exogeneity. Nevertheless, we relax this 
assumption in the robustness section of the results. 
 To account for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in error term, all 
coefficients t statistics are estimated with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors clustered 
by firm (Petersen, 2009). As a robustness check we also estimated t statistics based 
errors clustered by industry and country. The results remain qualitatively similar. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Board composition and financing choices 
The main results of our investigation are presented in table 3. In this table we show the 
results for 8 regressions, one for each of the independent variables considered in the 
baseline model.  In column (1) and (2) the independent variables are Book EE and 
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Market EE respectively. The variable % of independent reveals a positive and highly 
statistically significant coefficient, meaning that a board composed with a higher 
fraction of independent directors is associated with a higher fraction of external equity 
in their capital composition. This relation is economically relevant since the results 
estimates that an increase of 10% on the number of independent director is associated 
with an increase of 3.22% (2.14%) of the fraction of market (book) external equity 
financing. In columns (3) and (4) we present the regression results when the dependent 
variable is the Market RE and Book RE. Contrary to the results of external equity, 
retained earnings are now negatively associated with a higher fraction of independent 
directors in the board of directors and the coefficient is also highly statistically 
significant. This relation is also economically relevant since an increase of 10% on the 
number of independent directors is associated with a decrease of 2.94% (3.15%) of the 
fraction of retained earnings scaled by total market (book) capital. Together, the results 
from specifications (1) to (4) provide evidence in support of our prediction that a more 
independent board of directors facilitates the use of external equity as compared with 
internal equity. In specification (5) and (6) the dependent variables are now the book 
and market STD and in specification (7) and (8) the book and market values of LTD. 
According to the pecking order theory these sources of financing are between internal 
and external equity, being the STD preferable to LTD. Our prediction is that a more 
independent board should lead to a shift from STD and LTD. The results for the 
percentage of independent directors’ variable are consistent with our prediction. A more 
independent board is negatively associated with the use of short-term debt and 
positively associated with the use of long-term debt. These relations are still highly 
statistical significant. Further, an increase of 10% on the number of independent 
directors would reduce short term debt scaled by market capital by 0.65% and increase 
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long term debt over market capital by 1.67%. Overall the results provide supporting 
evidence that a more independent board leads to a rise over the order of financing 
choices proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). Particularly, a more independent board 
of directors is positively associated with the use of external equity and long term debt 
(at the bottom of the pecking order) and negatively associated with the use of retained 
earnings and short term debt (at the top of the pecking order). 
 With respect to the effect of gender composition of the board of directors, the 
results do not provide strong statistically results, since the coefficients are only 
statistically significant for two of the specifications. One potential problem is that the 
percentage of women directors is highly correlated with the percentage of independent 
directors, leading to collinearity problems in the estimation results. Further in the 
analysis will address again this issue. Nevertheless, consistent with our prediction the 
results show that a more gender diversified board of directors is positively associated 
with a higher use of market external equity (specification 1) and negatively associated 
with the short term debt use (specification 2). Although these results have lower t 
statistic values they provide some support that a more gender diversified board can lead 
firms to use more external equity and less retained earnings. With respect to STD and 
LTD the results are not consistent when using book or market values, since we obtain 
opposite and non-statistical significant signs.  
The effect of board size on the different types used financing sources is only 
statistical significant for specifications (5) to (8) where the dependent variables are 
market and book values of STD and LTD. The results support the idea that larger 
boards are more likely to use long term debt and less short term debt. These results may 
mean that a large board of directors reduces information asymmetries trough more 
disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) which in turn facilitate firms to use more long-
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term debt. Nevertheless, we find no evidence that larger boards lead firms to use more 
external equity and less retained earnings. 
 When the CEO is also the chairman of the board one should suspect of a less 
efficient board of directors and higher levels of information asymmetries. We therefore 
predict that for this kind of boards firms should use more internal equity and less 
external equity. The results of table 3 provide evidence in support of this prediction, that 
is, when the CEO is also the chairman the firm has lower levels of external equity and 
has a higher fraction of retained earnings. The coefficients of this dummy variable have 
the expect signs and are statistically significant for the market value of external equity 
and for both the market and book retained earnings. The association between this 
variable and the fraction of STD is negative. Following the results of the % of 
independent directors’ variable (where the relation found is negative), we expected to 
see a positive relation between this variable and the use of STD but the results are 
negative. Notwithstanding, the results for the market and the book values of LTD show 
the predicted sign and are highly statistical significant. Firms with a CEO that is also the 
chairman of the board use much less LTD. Putting together all results we find that the 
dummy CEO Chairman Duality is positively associated with retained earnings and 
negatively associated with the remaining sources of financing, which is also consistent 
with the prediction that a more independent board uses more risky financing sources. 
«insert Table 3 approximately here» 
 Turning now to the analysis of control variables, our proxies for growth 
opportunities (sales growth and R&D) are positively related with external equity 
financing and negatively related with the other sources of financing. These results are 
consistent with prior literature. Firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely 
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to face asset substitution and underinvestment problems. Therefore, these firms use 
more external equity as compared with debt. The negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and retained earnings may come from the fact that these firms are still in 
growing phase and for that reason have few positive earnings to retain. Additionally, in 
order to finance their new investment opportunities with external equity these firms 
might need to pay-out a large fraction of dividends as predicted by the signalling effect 
of dividends (Williams, 1988) to provide financial markets with a signal of the return on 
assets they invest and to reduce agency costs of equity (Easterbrook, 1984). With 
respect to the tax rate the results show a positive relation between this variable and the 
fraction of short term debt and a negative relationship with retained earnings, which is 
consistent with the tax shield hypothesis. Surprisingly, it seems that firms that pay 
higher tax rates use more external equity. One possible justification for this result is that 
firms that have higher tax rates are also more valuable firms, which in turn are more 
likely to issue more equity. Nevertheless, more research is needed to further explain this 
relationship. We further find no evidence as to whether tax rate has an influence of long 
term debt usage. With respect to firm dimension (measured as the log of sales), table 3 
results are also consistent with prior empirical literature, since it provides new evidence 
that larger firms are more likely to use debt as a preferred source of finance. The effect 
of depreciation on the different sources of finance is also consistent with prior empirical 
literature (e.g. DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) in the sense that firms with higher levels 
of assets depreciation use less debt financing sources and more external equity. Further, 
as expected the results show that firms with more depreciations also have less retained 
earnings, since depreciation are usually considered non-cash expenses and a part of the 
internal generated funds (Brown et al., 2009). As expected, tangibility is positively and 
highly statistically associated with the use of long term debt and negatively associated 
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with external equity and short term debt (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). Profitability, 
measured by return on assets is naturally positively associated with the fraction of 
retained. Further, in line with the pecking order theory and previous capital structure 
empirical studies (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2009), the results show that profitable firms are 
less likely to use long term debt. With respect to operating risk, measured as the 
standard deviation of ROA, the results show that firms with higher operating risk are 
less likely to issue debt (both short term and long term), and retained earnings. As 
expected firms with higher earnings volatility make more use of external equity. 
Finally, with respect to country level variables it is found that firms in countries with 
more developed stock markets rely more on external equity and less on long term debt. 
Moreover, as expected, firms based in countries where laws are more likely to protect 
the rights of borrowers and lenders have higher fractions of long term debt (Alves and 
Ferreira, 2011). 
4.2. Board composition and financing hierarchy  
In the previous subsection we have provided evidence that board composition has 
influence on the firm financing choices. Particularly, a board with more outside 
directors uses more external equity and long term debt and less retained earnings and 
short-term debt which is consistent with our hypothesis. We are however unable to 
provide evidence as to whether a more independent board of directors is more likely to 
use debt or external equity; long-term debt or external equity; and more retained 
earnings or short-term debt. In this subsection we provide further insights as to the 
trade-off between each of the four types of financing sources.  
In table 4 we consider an independent variable which relates the total debt (STD 
plus LTD) to total quasi market value of external financing (total debt plus market value 
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of external equity). Following previous capital structure empirical literature (e.g. Alves 
and Ferreira, 2011; Cronqvist et al., 2012), we focus on the quasi market values of 
financing sources to account for the possibility that managers think in terms of market 
values instead of book values (this is consistent with the hypothesis that managers time 
their equity issues as predicted by the market timing stylized facts). Nevertheless, 
results using book values show qualitative similar results. We then logarithmize this 
variable since data show some skewness and it provides better model adjustment. This 
variable is then regressed against the same independent variables considered in table 3. 
Further, to address potential multicollienarity problems among board composition 
variables we provide 5 specifications of the base line model. The first specification in 
column (1) includes all board related variables; in column (2) we focus on the effect of 
board independence; in column (3) the gender composition; in column (4) the board size 
and in column (5) we include only the dummy variable for CEO/Chair duality. 
 The results of column (1) and (2) of table 4 show a negative relationship 
between the fraction of debt over total external financing and percentage of independent 
directors in the board, providing support that a more independent board leads to an 
increase on the use of external equity (the more risky securities). Moreover, a board 
with a higher fraction of female directors is associated with less debt financing as 
compared with external equity financing, therefore consistent with the view that gender 
diversity in the board room improves its efficiency (Carter et al. 2003). With respect to 
board size it seems that larger boards are associated with less debt and more external 
equity, supporting the view that larger boards reduces information asymmetries. Finally, 
results from specification (5) provide some support (although with a small t statistic) 
that when the CEO is also the chairman of the board the firm is more likely to use debt 
over external equity financing. These results are consistent with those of Jiraporn and 
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Gleason (2007) in which they find an inverse relationship between leverage and 
shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder 
rights are more restricted consistent with agency theory, which predicts that leverage 
helps alleviate agency problems Jensen (1984). With respect to control variables, the 
results from table 4 are generally in line with those of columns (5) to (8) of table 3. 
«insert Table 4 approximately here» 
 Following the same methodological strategy of table 4, in table 5 we provide 
results from regressing a dependent variable that relates short term debt with retained 
earnings against board composition variables. Particularly, the dependent variable is 
defined as the logarithm of the fraction between retained earnings divided by short term 
debt plus retained earnings. We choose this fraction as opposed to short term debt in the 
numerator because this fraction reveals a better adjustment of the data (based on the R
2
 
measure).  
The results remain consistent with the hypothesis that a firm where its board is 
composed with more independent members and more gender diversified uses more 
risky sources of financing. Columns (1) to (3) of table 5 show that the percentage of 
independent and female directors are positively and statistically significant related with 
a higher fraction of short term debt as compared with retained earnings. Results from 
specification (4) show that firms with a board of directors with many members use more 
retained earnings than short-term debt, which is not consistent with the results from 
table 4, where the results support the view that a larger board contributes to facilitate the 
use of more risky financing sources. On plausible justification for this result is that a 
larger board can in fact reduce information asymmetries (by issuing more information) 
and therefore make it easier to issue external equity over total debt. But, at the same 
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time, a larger board can also be less effective in monitoring executive management. In 
this scope internal agents might be tempted to rely more on internal generated funds 
rather than on short term debt. One other possible justification for this effect is that 
board size may affect both board effectiveness and information asymmetries in a non-
linear way. To check this possibility we re-estimated specification (4) from table 5 
including a new variable defined as the square of Log(Board Size). The results then 
show that the Log(Board Size) size is positively related with the use of short-term debt 
and the square of Log(Board Size) is negatively related with short term debt. Both 
coefficients are statistically significant at 10% level. This could mean that board size 
can be related to capital structure in complex ways and further research is needed to 
explore those complexities. In column (5) of table 5 the coefficient of the CEO/Chair 
duality dummy variable is negative and statistically significant which is consistent with 
the view that a more independent board (where the chairman is a different person from 
that of the CEO) leads to an increase of short term debt in relation to retained earnings. 
With respect to the control variables the results show that our proxies for growth 
opportunities have different signs. The variable sales growth reveals to be positively 
associated with the use of short-term debt where we should expect to see a negative 
relationship. A plausible reason for this result is that firms that have high growth in their 
revenues rely much on short term debt to finance their increasing working capital needs. 
The variable R&D is negatively associated with the short term debt, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that growth opportunities lead to less use debt. The results from the 
tax rate variable reveal that firms with higher effective tax rates use much more short 
term debt than retained earnings which is consistent with the tax benefit of debt and this 
relationship is highly statistically significant in all five specifications. Consistent with 
the previous results the level of firm revenues is positively associated with the use short 
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term debt when compared with retained earnings. The level of depreciations is 
positively associated with the fraction of short term debt over short term debt plus 
retained earnings. This result can simply mean that firms with higher levels of 
depreciations retained fewer earnings, since deprecation is a non-cash expense that 
serves as internal generated funds for investment purposes. Results from table 5 reveal 
that firms with more tangible assets use less short term debt when compared with 
retained earnings. This finding is consistent with Bevan and Danbolt (2002) results. 
These authors argue that firms match their assets maturity with financing sources 
maturities. As such, ceteris paribus firms with more tangible assets have less current 
assets and thus less short term debt. Finally, the variables that measure profitability, 
operating risk, stock market development and lenders rights have coefficients with 
similar signs of those of table 4. 
«insert Table 5 approximately here» 
 In table 6 the dependent variable considered relates the use of long term debt 
with short term debt. This variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between the 
long term debt divided by total debt. The results from columns (1) and (2) reveal that 
the percentage of independent directors in the board is positively and statistically 
significant related with the use of long term in comparison with short term debt. 
Therefore, these results are consistent with the proposed hypothesis: firms with a more 
independent board are more likely to use more risky securities. The effect of gender 
diversity is not clear, since specification (1) show a negative relation and specification 
(3) a positive relation. One reason for this sign change is that the percentage of 
independent directors is highly correlated with the fraction of women directors (Pearson 
correlation yields up to 0.51). Therefore the negative sign can only be interpreted when 
the board has few independent directors. In fact, women directors cannot enhance board 
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independence if it has no independent directors. Further, since the t statistic of the 
percentage of women variable is relatively low in specification (1) (t=1.691) and 
relatively higher in specification (3) (t=2.240) the results provide some (limited) 
evidence that a more gender diversified board of directors is positively associated with 
more long term debt in comparison with short term debt. With respect to board size the 
relation is also limited since t statistics are quite low for both specification (1) and (4). 
Yet it is found a positive relation between board size and the use of long term debt 
supporting the view that bigger boards lower information asymmetry problems. 
Notwithstanding, as stated above, further research is needed to provide better 
perceptions concerning the relation between board size and financing sources. Finally, 
the results for the dummy variable CEO/duality are also not clear, since the sign of the 
relation changes from specification (1) to (5). Nevertheless, the association is not 
statistically different from zero. As such we are unable to provide supporting evidence 
as to whether a more independent chairman leads to a shift from short term debt to long 
term debt. With respect to the control variables, the results from table 6 are generally in 
line with those of columns (7) and (8) of table 3. An exception worth noting is the 
coefficient of the variable depreciation which in table 6 is found to be positively related 
with the fraction of long term debt over total debt. This result may lie in the fact that 
firms with higher levels of depreciation also have long lived assets, which in turn leads 
to the use of more long term debt in order to match the assets maturity with the 
financing sources maturity (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). 
 In table 7, the dependent variable considered is the fraction between long term 
debt and external equity plus long term debt. Again, the results provide strong support 
that a board of directors composed with more independent directors and more gender 
diversified uses more external equity when compared with long term debt. Also, 
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although not statistically significant, the size of the board is found to be negatively 
related with the use debt versus external equity. Moreover, when the board of directors 
has an independent chairman the firm has a higher fraction of external equity in 
comparison with long term debt. These results provide new insights, since that in table 3 
we find that board composition features leads the firm to use both more external equity 
and long term debt. With respect to the control variables the results shown in table 7 are 
generally in line with those of table 4. 
 Overall the results of tables 4 to 7 support the idea that a board composed in 
such a way that increases its independence and efficiency makes it easier for firms to 
issue more risky securities. Particularly, it is found that a board composed with more 
independent members: rely more on external financing rather than on retained earnings; 
more on short term debt than on retained earnings; more on long term than on short 
term debt; and more on equity than on long term debt.  
4.3. Robustness checks 
The results provided so far assume that the independent variables of interest, i.e. board 
of directors’ composition are exogenous and therefore unrelated with the error term. 
One potential source of endogeneity may come from reverse causality between 
financing sources and board of directors’ variables. If this is the case the coefficients 
estimates provided in tables 3 to 7 can be biased. To address this potential reverse 
causality problem we re-estimated tables 4 to 7 using the same variables but with the 
lagged values of the independent variables. In table 8, the regression results provided in 
Panel A replicate the regressions of column (1) from tables 4 to 7 considering one lag 
between the dependent variables and independent variables. In Panel B we replicate the 
same regressions using the maximum number lags available in the data (i.e. 4 years). 
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The results are generally preserved. Particularly, coefficients of the variable percentage 
of independent directors remain highly statistically significant and maintain the 
expected signs. The percentage of women directors also reveal the expected signs, 
except in specification (3) and (7) where the independent variable considered is long 
term debt over total debt. As in the results from table 6 also in this case we encounter 
collinearity problems among the percentage of female directors and other explanatory 
variables. In fact, when we re-estimate specification (3) and (7) dropping other board 
variables the coefficients turn positive. The results for the size of the board remain 
mixed. As discussed above this variable may relate to financing sources in complex 
ways and therefore we are unable to provide consistent evidence as to whether a larger 
board leads firms to scale up in the pecking order. With respect to role of the chairman 
of the board the results provide some evidence that a non-executive chairman may 
increase the board independence and lead the firm to rely more on risky financing 
sources. Overall the results support the view that the direction of causality goes from 
board of directors’ variables to financing sources and not the other way around. 
 To further control for possible endogeneity problems we re-estimated our 
models using an instrumental variable framework. Particularly, we rely on 2SLS 
regressions. This estimation technique directly addresses endogeneity problems of any 
kind (reverse causality, measurement errors in the regressors and omitted-variable bias). 
In this scope, the variables that we suspect to be endogenous are instrumented with the 
other independent variables as well as other variables not in the model (instruments). 
These instruments should be related to the variables instrumented (considered to 
endogenous) and should not be correlated with the error term. In table 9 we provide the 
second stage results of a 2SLS regression where the dependent variables are the same as 
those of table 8 and the variable percentage of independent directors on the board is 
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treated as endogenous and therefore instrumented. The selected instruments are the lag 
values of this variable. The results are identical to those of tables 4 to 8 and the 
coefficients of the variable percentage of independent directors do not have only the 
expected signs but are also highly statistical significant. To determine whether the 
variables of interest should be treated as endogenous variables, we use the Wooldridge’s 
(1995) robust score test (see bottom lines of table 9). If the test statistic is significant, 
then the variables being tested should be treated as endogenous. As can be seen this test 
is not rejected at any usual level of significance. As such we do not reject the hypothesis 
that the variable percentage of independent directors is exogenous. In other words, we 
confirm the validity of the previous results that treated this variable as exogenous. 
Further, also in the bottom of table 9 we provide results for the assessment of the 
instruments validity. The Sargan’s (1958)  test of overidentifying restrictions is 
employed to this end. A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the 
instruments may not be valid. The results obtained for this test are not rejected at any 
typical level of significance. Further, the partial R
2
 which measures the level of 
correlation between the instrumented variable and the instruments is also presented and 
in all specification their value is very high. In sum, the results suggest that instruments 
are valid. In this analysis we have focused on the independent directors’ variable in 
order to avoid collienarity problems. Nevertheless, we have conducted the same 
analysis considering the percentage of women directors instead of the percentage of 
independent directors and results reveal the same signs of those presented here 
including high values of the z statistics. The results for the size of the board and 
CEO/Chair duality are similar to those of table 8. 
 In table 10 we analyse the results in a cross section framework for each year in 
the sample period. By these means one can check whether the results are consistent over 
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the period considered. The results are relatively similar to those presented in Table 9. 
Particularly, for every year the coefficient of the variable percentage of independent 
directors is the same as in table 9 and statistical significant for all years except in Panel 
A and D for the 2008 year. This lack of statistical significance may be related to the 
subprime crisis where stock prices significantly dropped and since we are measuring 
debt as book values this price drop is not seen in the value of debt which should be 
probably seen if debt market values where available. 
 We have subject our results to battery of additional sensitiveness tests. 
Following Alves and Ferreira (2011) we re-estimated the results of tables 4 to 7 
excluding utilities, since some of these firms are regulated in a number of countries and 
therefore can be subject to specific forces that drive its financing choices. Further, we 
also have excluded firms from the United States and then the firms from Japan. We also 
have substituted the proxies of growth opportunities with the lag value of the market to 
book ratio (in order to minimize the mechanical relationship between this variable and 
the market based financing sources measures), defined as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of total debt divided by the book value of assets. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported above. These sensitiveness tests are not reported 
in the present paper to conserve space but available from the authors upon request. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article investigates empirically how the board of directors’ composition affects the 
mix of financing sources used by firms. The investigation is conducted using a panel 
data of 2,427 firms from 33 countries over the period of 2006 to 2010. After controlling 
for a wide set of capital structure determinants the results show that firms with a board 
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of directors composed with more independent directors are more likely to use higher 
fractions of riskier financing sources. Particularly, the results provide strong evidence 
that firms with a larger fraction of independent directors on the board: (1) use more 
external financing sources when compared with retained earnings; (2) use more short 
term debt in relation with retained earnings; (3) use more long term debt compared with 
short term debt; and (4) use more external equity than long term debt. These results are 
consistent with our hypothesis which conjectures that a more independent board should 
lead firms to reduce information asymmetries between managers and outside investors 
and by that means reduce the cost of issuing more risky sources of financing as 
predicted by the pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
The results also provide some evidence that a more gender diversified board of directors 
and where the chairman is non-executive (i.e. the CEO is a different person from that of 
the chairman) can improve the board of directors’ independence and efficiency and 
therefore lead the firm to rely more on long term sources of financing. The effect of 
board size on financing choices is mixed, since larger boards can be more or less 
effective depending on the complexity of the firm. 
With respect to policy implications the present study provides new insights into 
the way firms can issue more external sources of finance. The result that a firm with a 
more independent board of directors issue more long term debt and external equity 
suggests that it can match more easily (i.e. less costly) the maturity of their assets with 
the maturity of their financing sources (Hall et al., 2000). The results also provide 
important implications to securities regulators, since the investigation suggests that 
firms with more independent directors are more likely to issue long term debt and 
external equity. If that is the case, then regulators could promote the inclusion of 
independent directors in the board of directors of listed firms in order to develop their 
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financial markets. Lastly, the results also add to the discussion over the capital structure 
theories. If the trade-off theory is to hold stand alone and the pecking order theory is not 
then one should not see such strong effect between the board of directors’ structure and 
the use of different financing sources. In fact the present study results suggest that 
managers pick financing sources taking into account the level of information 
asymmetry. Further, the results suggest that board independence is not only important to 
align the manager interest with those of the owners but is also important to other 
financing suppliers, such as bondholders. 
The results presented are consistent with a number of empirical findings 
previously documented in the literature. For example, our results are consistent with the 
findings of Cronqvist et al. (2012) where firms with strong governance devices are less 
likely to reveal corporate leverage practices that arise from the CEO personal 
preferences. The results are also consistent with the literature that argue that governance 
mechanisms can substitute the effect of debt in reducing the free cash flow agency 
problems (e.g. Berger et al. 1997 and Jiraporn et al. 2012), since we find that firms with 
a more independent board of directors relies more heavily on external equity when 
compared with total debt and long term debt. Finally, the results are also consistent with 
previous empirical work that finds a negative relation between corporate governance 
devices and the cost of debt (e.g. Fields et al. 2012). 
This study has several limitations that should be stressed. First, the financing 
sources are measured using book values and quasi market values. Given that long term 
debt market values can be much lower than book values during the sample period here 
considered the results are not as robust as would be if market values were considered. 
Further, the study do not do not segregate public from private debt. Information 
asymmetries costs are potentially lower for private debt since creditors can monitor 
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more closely executive management. Additionally, the sample data analysed has a small 
time span (5 years) and a large cross section. Therefore, the results presented are more 
likely to characterize different financing policies across firms than across time. Finally, 
the present study does not control for firm ownership heterogeneity. Firms with diverse 
ownership structures may have different information asymmetry levels. As such, this 
study’s findings would benefit from further research that considers these limitations. 
Future research could exploit these limitations and further provide new evidence as to 
whether other corporate governance devices could change firm financing choices, for 
example ownership structure. 
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Table 1 – Country statistics. 
 
Country 
Firms 
(1) 
N 
(2) 
Market EE 
(3) 
Market RE 
(4) 
Market STD 
(5) 
Market LTD 
(6) 
Australia 180 900 0.718 -0.013 0.103 0.194 
Austria 7 35 0.377 0.181 0.127 0.315 
Belgium 7 35 0.498 0.177 0.097 0.219 
Brazil 14 70 0.545 0.085 0.121 0.247 
Britain 197 985 0.471 0.156 0.152 0.223 
Canada 92 460 0.652 0.049 0.054 0.245 
China 56 280 0.634 0.099 0.192 0.074 
Denmark 13 65 0.490 0.219 0.136 0.154 
Finland 25 125 0.385 0.228 0.183 0.203 
France 43 215 0.459 0.089 0.179 0.263 
Germany 9 45 0.512 0.065 0.172 0.234 
Greece 4 20 0.435 0.147 0.150 0.269 
Hong Kong 22 110 0.513 0.191 0.107 0.186 
India 289 1,445 0.253 0.240 0.221 0.264 
Ireland 14 70 0.598 0.042 0.113 0.251 
Israel 3 15 0.630 0.105 0.147 0.119 
Italy 18 90 0.325 0.193 0.170 0.311 
Japan 722 3,610 0.239 0.323 0.230 0.207 
Luxembourg 5 25 0.469 0.171 0.146 0.204 
Malaysia 7 35 0.524 0.182 0.093 0.201 
Netherlands 21 105 0.466 0.133 0.183 0.215 
New Zealand 8 40 0.430 0.294 0.070 0.205 
Norway 6 30 0.306 0.166 0.172 0.356 
Portugal 3 15 0.461 0.147 0.103 0.289 
Russia 7 35 0.386 0.387 0.092 0.132 
Singapore 17 85 0.475 0.185 0.181 0.158 
South Africa 27 135 0.522 0.187 0.126 0.165 
Spain 15 75 0.417 0.128 0.122 0.325 
Sweden 23 115 0.460 0.202 0.156 0.182 
Switzerland 27 135 0.533 0.177 0.108 0.181 
Thailand 2 10 0.472 0.248 0.087 0.193 
Turkey 5 25 0.347 0.234 0.278 0.141 
United States 539 2,695 0.596 0.065 0.094 0.246 
       
Full Sample 2,427 12,135 0.432 0.179 0.163 0.223 
 
Note: This table reports per country firms, observation and means of the market financing sources. 
Market EE is defined as market external equity (MEE) divided by market capital. MEE is computed as 
the market value of equity minus the book value of retained earnings. Market capital is defined as book 
capital less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Book capital is defined as the book 
value of assets less accounts payable. Market RE is defined as book value of retained earnings (RE) 
divided by market capital. Market STD is defined as book value of current liabilities due within one year 
(STD) minus accounts payable divided by market capital. Market LTD is defined as total book value of 
non-current liabilities (LTD) divided by market capital. 
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Table 2 - Description and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
Variable Description 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
Panel A: Financing sources      
Book EE Defined as book external equity (BEE) divided by book capital. 
BEE is computed as the book value of equity minus the book 
value of retained earnings. Book capital is defined as the book 
value of assets less accounts payable. 
12,135 0.291 0.389 0.122 0.349 
Book RE Defined as book value of retained earnings (RE) divided by 
book capital. Book capital is defined as the book value of assets 
less accounts payable. 
12,135 0.214 0.405 0.096 0.401 
Book STD Defined as book value of current liabilities due within one year 
(STD) minus accounts payable divided by book capital. Book 
capital is defined as the book value of assets less accounts 
payable. 
12,135 0.208 0.135 0.110 0.275 
Book LTD Defined as total book value of non-current liabilities (LTD) 
divided by book capital. Book capital is defined as the book 
value of assets less accounts payable. 
12,135 0.284 0.196 0.129 0.405 
Market EE Defined as market external equity (MEE) divided by market 
capital. MEE is computed as the market value of equity minus 
the book value of retained earnings. Market capital is defined as 
book capital less the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity. Book capital is defined as the book value of assets 
less accounts payable.  
12,135 0.432 0.373 0.212 0.645 
Market RE Defined as book value of retained earnings (RE) divided by 
market capital. Market capital is defined as book capital less the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Book 
capital is defined as the book value of assets less accounts 
payable. 
12,135 0.179 0.313 0.063 0.291 
Market STD Defined as book value of current liabilities due within one year 
(STD) minus accounts payable divided by market capital. 
Market capital is defined as book capital less the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity. Book capital is defined 
as the book value of assets less accounts payable. 
12,135 0.163 0.130 0.068 0.224 
Market LTD Defined as total book value of non-current liabilities (LTD) 
divided by market capital. Market capital is defined as book 
capital less the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity. Book capital is defined as the book value of assets less 
accounts payable. 
12,135 0.223 0.170 0.086 0.324 
Panel B: Board composition variables      
% independent Ratio between the number of independent directors and number 
of directors on the firm’s board (board size), as reported by the 
company. Independence is defined according to the company's 
own criteria. 
12,135 0.439 0.281 0.200 0.692 
% women Ratio between the number of women and number of directors 
on the firm’s board (board size), as reported by the company. 12,135 0.065 0.088 0.000 0.111 
Board size The total number of directors on the firm’s board. If the 
company has supervisory and management boards, this is the 
total members of the supervisory board. 
12,135 9.745 3.247 8.000 12.000 
CEO/chair 
duality 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company's 
Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of the Board and 0 12,135 0.392 0.488 0.000 1.000 
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otherwise. 
Panel C: Firm Specific control variables      
Sales growth Average growth rate of firm’s operating revenues during the 
sample period (between 2006 and 2010). 12,135 0.122 0.188 0.034 0.146 
R&D to assets Value of firm’s investment in research and development (R&D) 
scaled by book value of assets. 12,135 0.016 0.039 0.000 0.018 
Tax rate Total of corporate income taxes paid divided by the pre-tax 
profit is then used as a control variable. Censored to be between 
zero and one. 
12,135 0.341 0.245 0.214 0.398 
Log(Sales) Logarithm of the total value of firm’s operating revenues, sales 
or turnover, as reported by the firm as of the end of fiscal year. 12,135 7.418 2.132 6.335 8.820 
Depreciation to 
assets 
Value of firm’s reported depreciation and amortization divided 
by book value of assets. 12,135 0.039 0.026 0.023 0.049 
Tangibility Book value of fixed assets as reported by the firm (such as 
machinery, buildings and land) divided by book value of assets. 12,135 0.334 0.220 0.155 0.475 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to book value of total assets. 12,135 0.091 0.104 0.041 0.129 
Sigma (ROA) Standard deviation of ROA (%) over the sample period (from 
2006 to 2010). 12,135 3.874 4.654 1.326 4.690 
Panel D: Country Specific      
Log(Market cap 
to GDP ratio) 
Logarithm of the per capita gross domestic product (USD) of 
the country where the firm is based. 12,135 4.594 0.451 4.312 4.922 
Legal rights 
indicator 
Index that ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating 
that these countries bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. 
12,135 7.802 1.484 7.000 9.000 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. All of the data were obtained from Bloomberg, 
except for the country-specific variables, which were gathered from the World Bank’s website. All of the values are presented in 
USD unless otherwise specified. 
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Table 3 - Industry- and year-fixed effects regression of financial sources.  
 
Explanatory variables 
Market EE 
 (1) 
Book EE 
(2) 
Market RE 
(3) 
Book RE 
(4) 
Market STD 
(5) 
Book STD 
(6) 
Market LTD 
(7) 
Book LTD 
(8) 
% independent  0.322*** 
(13.121) 
0.214*** 
(8.304) 
-0.294*** 
(13.217) 
-0.315*** 
(11.240) 
-0.102*** 
(11.774) 
-0.065*** 
(6.564) 
0.074*** 
(6.656) 
0.167*** 
(12.363) 
% women 0.160** 
(2.146) 
-0.022 
(0.268) 
-0.101 
(1.503) 
-0.082 
(0.958) 
-0.040* 
(1.854) 
0.047 
(1.600) 
-0.030 
(0.868) 
0.039 
(0.921) 
Log(Board size) 0.023 
(1.313) 
-0.006 
(0.345) 
-0.009 
(0.526) 
-0.005 
(0.224) 
-0.039*** 
(5.174) 
-0.029*** 
(3.391) 
0.018** 
(2.034) 
0.035*** 
(3.201) 
CEO/Chair duality -0.032*** 
(3.221) 
-0.008 
(0.803) 
0.044*** 
(4.672) 
0.043*** 
(3.847) 
-0.000 
(0.129) 
-0.020*** 
(4.574) 
-0.012*** 
(2.586) 
-0.016*** 
(2.882) 
Sales growth 0.210*** 
(4.967) 
0.141*** 
(3.195) 
-0.146*** 
(4.132) 
-0.125*** 
(2.868) 
-0.051*** 
(4.614) 
-0.020 
(1.633) 
-0.013 
(0.707) 
0.002 
(0.079) 
R&D to assets 1.235*** 
(3.605) 
2.782*** 
(3.130) 
-0.532* 
(1.718) 
-2.389** 
(2.505) 
-0.223*** 
(5.077) 
-0.048 
(0.701) 
-0.483*** 
(6.228) 
-0.338*** 
(3.371) 
Tax rate 0.061** 
(2.481) 
0.118*** 
(4.704) 
-0.093*** 
(4.117) 
-0.133*** 
(5.141) 
0.031*** 
(4.625) 
0.015** 
(2.161) 
0.009 
(1.053) 
0.010 
(1.062) 
Log(Sales) -0.021*** 
(4.262) 
-0.039*** 
(8.085) 
0.003 
(0.856) 
0.017*** 
(3.662) 
0.007*** 
(4.709) 
0.007*** 
(4.706) 
0.013*** 
(7.645) 
0.016*** 
(8.969) 
Depreciation to assets 1.179*** 
(3.708) 
0.381 
(0.923) 
-0.788*** 
(2.679) 
-0.525 
(1.238) 
-0.231*** 
(3.503) 
-0.046 
(0.577) 
-0.121 
(1.039) 
0.211 
(1.263) 
Tangibility -0.217*** 
(6.509) 
-0.115*** 
(3.065) 
0.037 
(1.292) 
-0.007 
(0.167) 
-0.065*** 
(6.164) 
-0.127*** 
(10.309) 
0.258*** 
(14.642) 
0.266*** 
(13.644) 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.240** 
(2.312) 
-1.176*** 
(9.199) 
0.460*** 
(5.240) 
1.418*** 
(9.912) 
-0.232*** 
(9.703) 
0.042* 
(1.650) 
-0.469*** 
(13.827) 
-0.266*** 
(6.787) 
Sigma (ROA) 0.013*** 
(7.276) 
0.014*** 
(5.966) 
-0.006*** 
(3.562) 
-0.009*** 
(3.339) 
-0.003*** 
(6.172) 
-0.002*** 
(3.375) 
-0.004*** 
(6.828) 
-0.003*** 
(4.256) 
Log(Market cap to GDP) 0.109*** 
(7.779) 
0.051*** 
(3.148) 
-0.036*** 
(3.145) 
-0.003 
(0.140) 
-0.019*** 
(4.587) 
0.000 
(0.031) 
-0.053*** 
(7.890) 
-0.049*** 
(6.035) 
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Legal rights indicator -0.002 
(0.521) 
0.002 
(0.461) 
-0.004 
(1.163) 
-0.010** 
(2.024) 
-0.007*** 
(4.704) 
-0.012*** 
(5.208) 
0.014*** 
(6.904) 
0.021*** 
(8.120) 
Constant -0.114 
(1.632) 
0.264*** 
(4.062) 
0.499*** 
(8.240) 
0.281*** 
(3.626) 
0.434*** 
(16.926) 
0.395*** 
(12.996) 
0.164*** 
(4.620) 
0.042 
(0.992) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,135 12,135 12,135 12,135 12,135 12,135 12,135 12,135 
R
2
 0.304 0.358 0.164 0.288 0.302 0.150 0.374 0.335 
F Statistic 
(p-value) 
138.282 
(0.000) 
16.798 
(0.000) 
26.170 
(0.000) 
21.272 
(0.000) 
73.291 
(0.000) 
30.654 
(0.000) 
119.707 
(0.000) 
77.052 
(0.000) 
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in firms and heteroskedastic robust variance estimators. t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Refer to table 2 for variables definition. 
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Table 4 – Regression results of the fraction between total debt and total external financing.  
 
Explanatory variables 
Board 
composition 
(1) 
Board 
independence 
(2) 
Board 
gender 
(3) 
Board 
size 
(4) 
Board 
chairman 
(5) 
% independent -0.468*** 
(7.727) 
-0.512*** 
(9.484) 
   
% women -0.285* 
(1.750) 
 -0.896*** 
(6.228) 
  
Log(Board size) -0.120*** 
(2.610) 
  -0.111** 
(2.395) 
 
CEO/Chair duality 0.031 
(1.271) 
   0.061** 
(2.441) 
Sales Growth -0.454*** 
(3.964) 
-0.439*** 
(3.853) 
-0.490*** 
(4.263) 
-0.488*** 
(4.235) 
-0.463*** 
(3.968) 
R&D to assets -2.984*** 
(6.066) 
-2.972*** 
(6.066) 
-3.036*** 
(6.140) 
-2.966*** 
(5.983) 
-2.998*** 
(6.034) 
Tax rate -0.102* 
(1.894) 
-0.091* 
(1.720) 
-0.037 
(0.686) 
-0.015 
(0.271) 
-0.023 
(0.436) 
Log(Sales) 0.105*** 
(7.377) 
0.094*** 
(7.160) 
0.091*** 
(6.971) 
0.092*** 
(6.514) 
0.082*** 
(6.413) 
Depreciation to assets -0.849* 
(1.695) 
-0.762 
(1.521) 
-0.684 
(1.328) 
-0.684 
(1.315) 
-0.570 
(1.095) 
Tangibility 0.665*** 
(7.067) 
0.652*** 
(6.973) 
0.642*** 
(6.771) 
0.667*** 
(6.908) 
0.645*** 
(6.769) 
Return on assets (ROA) -1.991*** 
(7.040) 
-1.990*** 
(7.021) 
-2.066*** 
(7.286) 
-2.132*** 
(7.478) 
-2.110*** 
(7.383) 
Sigma (ROA) -0.040*** 
(7.756) 
-0.040*** 
(7.718) 
-0.041*** 
(7.880) 
-0.042*** 
(8.022) 
-0.041*** 
(7.854) 
Log(Market cap to GDP 
ratio) 
-0.334*** 
(10.058) 
-0.341*** 
(10.161) 
-0.353*** 
(9.864) 
-0.362*** 
(9.826) 
-0.363*** 
(9.951) 
Legal rights indicator 0.033*** 
(2.864) 
0.035*** 
(3.014) 
0.007 
(0.671) 
-0.004 
(0.384) 
-0.001 
(0.075) 
Constant 0.129 
(0.751) 
-0.038 
(0.234) 
0.122 
(0.735) 
0.429** 
(2.397) 
0.210 
(1.251) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,018 12,018 12,018 12,018 12,018 
R
2
 0.360 0.358 0.347 0.342 0.342 
F Statistic 
(p-value) 
124.425 
(0.000) 
139.567 
(0.000) 
136.076 
(0.000) 
135.114 
(0.000) 
136.098 
(0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total debt divided total external financing sources. Total debt is 
defined as book value of STD plus book value of LTD. Total external financing sources is defined as total 
debt plus market value of external equity. Refer to table 2 for description of independent variables. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in firms and heteroskedastic robust variance estimators. t statistics 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5 – Regression results of the fraction between short term debt and retained earnings plus short term 
debt. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Board 
composition 
(1) 
Board 
independence 
(2) 
Board 
gender 
(3) 
Board 
size 
(4) 
Board 
chairman 
(5) 
% independent 0.274*** 
(4.210) 
0.343*** 
(5.719) 
   
% women 0.337* 
(1.835) 
 0.688*** 
(4.052) 
  
Log(Board size) -0.110** 
(2.261) 
  -0.115** 
(2.322) 
 
CEO/Chair duality -0.065** 
(2.344) 
   -0.081*** 
(2.880) 
Sales Growth 0.342*** 
(3.315) 
0.352*** 
(3.435) 
0.398*** 
(3.829) 
0.370*** 
(3.604) 
0.363*** 
(3.507) 
R&D to assets -0.687 
(1.472) 
-0.777* 
(1.664) 
-0.797* 
(1.677) 
-0.898* 
(1.849) 
-0.850* 
(1.764) 
Tax rate 0.254*** 
(5.237) 
0.244*** 
(5.036) 
0.201*** 
(4.121) 
0.171*** 
(3.504) 
0.196*** 
(4.005) 
Log(Sales) 0.032*** 
(3.434) 
0.024*** 
(2.770) 
0.026*** 
(3.007) 
0.043*** 
(4.517) 
0.034*** 
(3.974) 
Depreciation to assets 1.258** 
(2.159) 
1.353** 
(2.325) 
1.297** 
(2.214) 
1.179** 
(2.003) 
1.216** 
(2.082) 
Tangibility -0.430*** 
(4.831) 
-0.454*** 
(5.136) 
-0.447*** 
(5.087) 
-0.434*** 
(4.930) 
-0.448*** 
(5.101) 
Return on assets (ROA) -1.392*** 
(6.739) 
-1.360*** 
(6.508) 
-1.274*** 
(6.220) 
-1.212*** 
(6.093) 
-1.232*** 
(6.155) 
Sigma (ROA) -0.016*** 
(3.022) 
-0.016*** 
(2.850) 
-0.015*** 
(2.722) 
-0.015*** 
(2.809) 
-0.015*** 
(2.816) 
Log(Market cap to GDP 
ratio) 
-0.063 
(1.530) 
-0.063 
(1.511) 
-0.057 
(1.352) 
-0.046 
(1.088) 
-0.052 
(1.224) 
Legal rights indicator 0.001 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.220) 
0.019* 
(1.737) 
0.024** 
(2.166) 
0.025** 
(2.270) 
Constant -0.465** 
(2.224) 
-0.689*** 
(3.673) 
-0.786*** 
(4.179) 
-0.689*** 
(3.268) 
-0.831*** 
(4.385) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,364 11,364 11,364 11,364 11,364 
R
2
 0.089 0.086 0.081 0.078 0.078 
F Statistic 
(p-value) 
12.382 
(0.000) 
13.116 
(0.000) 
12.190 
(0.000) 
11.906 
(0.000) 
12.360 
(0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the fraction between retained earnings 
divided by short term debt plus retained earnings. Refer to table 2 for description of independent 
variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in firms and heteroskedastic robust variance estimators. 
t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6 – Regression results of the fraction between long term debt and total debt. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Board 
composition 
(1) 
Board 
independence 
(2) 
Board 
gender 
(3) 
Board 
size 
(4) 
Board 
chairman 
(5) 
% independent 0.480*** 
(8.472) 
0.432*** 
(8.811) 
   
% women -0.283* 
(1.691) 
 0.330** 
(2.240) 
  
Log(Board size) 0.091** 
(2.113) 
  0.075* 
(1.716) 
 
CEO/Chair duality 0.016 
(0.717) 
   -0.011 
(0.501) 
Sales Growth -0.045 
(0.480) 
-0.050 
(0.550) 
-0.013 
(0.142) 
-0.010 
(0.108) 
-0.021 
(0.225) 
R&D to assets -1.045*** 
(2.790) 
-1.011*** 
(2.700) 
-0.984*** 
(2.610) 
-1.013*** 
(2.687) 
-1.001*** 
(2.654) 
Tax rate 0.051 
(1.411) 
0.052 
(1.426) 
-0.007 
(0.184) 
-0.014 
(0.384) 
-0.014 
(0.380) 
Log(Sales) 0.078*** 
(8.917) 
0.085*** 
(10.874) 
0.091*** 
(11.530) 
0.088*** 
(9.908) 
0.094*** 
(12.279) 
Depreciation to assets 1.530*** 
(2.970) 
1.468*** 
(2.842) 
1.365*** 
(2.589) 
1.388*** 
(2.633) 
1.328** 
(2.526) 
Tangibility 0.993*** 
(13.859) 
1.011*** 
(14.188) 
1.016*** 
(14.144) 
1.002*** 
(13.823) 
1.015*** 
(14.134) 
Return on assets (ROA) -1.109*** 
(5.658) 
-1.126*** 
(5.729) 
-1.035*** 
(5.225) 
-1.007*** 
(5.123) 
-1.017*** 
(5.185) 
Sigma (ROA) -0.015*** 
(3.564) 
-0.015*** 
(3.733) 
-0.014*** 
(3.369) 
-0.013*** 
(3.217) 
-0.013*** 
(3.330) 
Log(Market cap to GDP 
ratio) 
-0.189*** 
(4.148) 
-0.189*** 
(4.101) 
-0.172*** 
(3.715) 
-0.170*** 
(3.655) 
-0.168*** 
(3.634) 
Legal rights indicator 0.104*** 
(6.147) 
0.102*** 
(6.045) 
0.130*** 
(8.111) 
0.135*** 
(8.662) 
0.133*** 
(8.515) 
Constant -1.983*** 
(9.565) 
-1.812*** 
(9.323) 
-2.009*** 
(10.505) 
-2.178*** 
(10.679) 
-2.048*** 
(10.852) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,135 12,135 12,135 12,135 12,135 
R
2
 0.241 0.239 0.225 0.224 0.224 
F Statistic 
(p-value) 
43.064 
(0.000) 
47.917 
(0.000) 
39.826 
(0.000) 
39.080 
(0.000) 
38.577 
(0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the fraction between long term divided by 
short term debt plus long term debt. Refer to table 2 for description of independent variables. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clusters in firms and heteroskedastic robust variance estimators. t statistics in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 7 – Regression results of the fraction between long term debt and external equity plus long term 
debt. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Board 
composition 
(1) 
Board 
independence 
(2) 
Board 
gender 
(3) 
Board 
size 
(4) 
Board 
chairman 
(5) 
% independent -0.231** 
(2.352) 
-0.341*** 
(3.958) 
   
% women -0.669** 
(2.439) 
 -0.985*** 
(4.111) 
  
Log(Board size) -0.068 
(0.918) 
  -0.071 
(0.961) 
 
CEO/Chair duality 0.070* 
(1.748) 
   0.088** 
(2.176) 
Sales Growth -0.641*** 
(3.559) 
-0.628*** 
(3.520) 
-0.669*** 
(3.746) 
-0.660*** 
(3.679) 
-0.634*** 
(3.508) 
R&D to assets -4.303*** 
(5.522) 
-4.249*** 
(5.462) 
-4.314*** 
(5.548) 
-4.244*** 
(5.437) 
-4.279*** 
(5.464) 
Tax rate -0.016 
(0.210) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.025 
(0.321) 
0.051 
(0.652) 
0.036 
(0.464) 
Log(Sales) 0.187*** 
(9.050) 
0.179*** 
(9.488) 
0.181*** 
(9.622) 
0.178*** 
(8.692) 
0.170*** 
(9.295) 
Depreciation to assets 0.180 
(0.210) 
0.227 
(0.264) 
0.239 
(0.280) 
0.280 
(0.323) 
0.378 
(0.436) 
Tangibility 1.493*** 
(10.359) 
1.495*** 
(10.443) 
1.485*** 
(10.375) 
1.505*** 
(10.334) 
1.487*** 
(10.340) 
Return on assets (ROA) -3.445*** 
(7.854) 
-3.462*** 
(7.855) 
-3.487*** 
(7.983) 
-3.554*** 
(8.111) 
-3.532*** 
(8.038) 
Sigma (ROA) -0.060*** 
(7.287) 
-0.061*** 
(7.322) 
-0.061*** 
(7.432) 
-0.062*** 
(7.499) 
-0.061*** 
(7.340) 
Log(Market cap to GDP 
ratio) 
-0.561*** 
(8.353) 
-0.570*** 
(8.380) 
-0.573*** 
(8.394) 
-0.584*** 
(8.451) 
-0.582*** 
(8.481) 
Legal rights indicator 0.119*** 
(4.887) 
0.120*** 
(4.884) 
0.106*** 
(4.537) 
0.094*** 
(4.071) 
0.097*** 
(4.211) 
Constant -1.032*** 
(3.274) 
-1.074*** 
(3.609) 
-1.023*** 
(3.524) 
-0.771** 
(2.480) 
-0.939*** 
(3.239) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,827 11,827 11,827 11,827 11,827 
R
2
 0.347 0.345 0.345 0.342 0.343 
F Statistic 
(p-value) 
92.336 
(0.000) 
103.208 
(0.000) 
102.285 
(0.000) 
101.921 
(0.000) 
101.860 
(0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of long-term debt divided by total external equity plus long-term 
debt. Refer to table 2 for description of independent variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in 
firms and heteroskedastic robust variance estimators. t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 8 – Panel data regressions results of financing sources with lagged dependent variables. 
 
 Panel A:  (endogenous variable) t+1  Panel B:  (endogenous variable) t+4 
 
TD/(EE+TD)  
(1) 
STD/(RE+STD)  
(2) 
LTD/TD 
(3) 
LTD/(EE+LTD) 
(4) 
 TD/(EE+TD)  
(5) 
STD/(RE+STD)  
(6) 
LTD/TD 
(7) 
LTD/(EE+LTD) 
(8) 
% independent -0.532*** 
(8.365) 
0.290*** 
(4.267) 
0.509*** 
(8.537) 
-0.282*** 
(2.728) 
 -0.713*** 
(8.664) 
0.224*** 
(2.791) 
0.452*** 
(6.346) 
-0.490*** 
(3.929) 
% women -0.313* 
(1.819) 
0.322* 
(1.684) 
-0.278 
(1.635) 
-0.716** 
(2.503) 
 -0.139 
(0.686) 
0.441** 
(1.983) 
-0.415** 
(2.026) 
-0.689** 
(1.994) 
Log(Board size) -0.126*** 
(2.652) 
-0.108** 
(2.111) 
0.065 
(1.389) 
-0.104 
(1.308) 
 -0.054 
(0.922) 
-0.091 
(1.553) 
0.025 
(0.470) 
-0.082 
(0.891) 
CEO/Chair duality 0.040 
(1.563) 
-0.081*** 
(2.839) 
0.019 
(0.789) 
0.081* 
(1.897) 
 0.089*** 
(2.894) 
-0.060* 
(1.759) 
0.030 
(1.071) 
0.128*** 
(2.663) 
Sales Growth -0.467*** 
(3.868) 
0.310*** 
(2.870) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
-0.632*** 
(3.296) 
 -0.277* 
(1.884) 
0.198 
(1.433) 
-0.076 
(0.513) 
-0.419* 
(1.653) 
R&D to assets -2.558*** 
(5.025) 
-0.497 
(1.064) 
-0.533 
(1.297) 
-3.266*** 
(4.098) 
 -1.734** 
(2.427) 
-0.024 
(0.059) 
0.397 
(1.073) 
-1.484* 
(1.698) 
Tax rate -0.082 
(1.473) 
0.239*** 
(4.754) 
0.069* 
(1.680) 
0.027 
(0.326) 
 -0.192* 
(1.712) 
0.036 
(0.307) 
-0.149* 
(1.678) 
-0.286* 
(1.704) 
Log(Sales) 0.106*** 
(7.450) 
0.035*** 
(3.515) 
0.078*** 
(8.756) 
0.190*** 
(9.219) 
 0.120*** 
(7.658) 
0.047*** 
(3.805) 
0.083*** 
(7.527) 
0.213*** 
(9.411) 
Depreciation to 
assets 
-1.259** 
(2.540) 
1.243* 
(1.813) 
1.123** 
(2.351) 
-0.775 
(0.970) 
 -2.055*** 
(2.987) 
-0.945 
(0.867) 
1.122 
(1.433) 
-1.886 
(1.341) 
Tangibility 0.675*** 
(6.893) 
-0.473*** 
(5.138) 
0.980*** 
(13.947) 
1.496*** 
(10.292) 
 0.678*** 
(6.007) 
-0.249** 
(2.174) 
0.766*** 
(9.184) 
1.330*** 
(7.780) 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
-1.424*** 
(5.053) 
-1.517*** 
(6.830) 
-0.909*** 
(4.544) 
-2.599*** 
(6.007) 
 -0.745** 
(2.312) 
-1.536*** 
(5.363) 
-0.693*** 
(2.950) 
-1.642*** 
(3.322) 
Sigma (ROA) -0.038*** 
(7.414) 
-0.014** 
(2.393) 
-0.013*** 
(2.641) 
-0.056*** 
(6.437) 
 -0.034*** 
(6.227) 
-0.002 
(0.198) 
-0.010 
(1.493) 
-0.049*** 
(4.796) 
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Log(Market cap to 
GDP ratio) 
-0.240*** 
(7.324) 
-0.060 
(1.409) 
-0.184*** 
(3.813) 
-0.434*** 
(6.261) 
 -0.570*** 
(7.465) 
-0.134* 
(1.680) 
-0.123 
(1.594) 
-0.804*** 
(6.628) 
Legal rights 
indicator 
0.018 
(1.518) 
-0.004 
(0.314) 
0.097*** 
(5.940) 
0.094*** 
(3.796) 
 0.044** 
(2.567) 
0.009 
(0.566) 
0.066*** 
(4.137) 
0.101*** 
(3.675) 
Constant -0.165 
(0.942) 
-0.452** 
(2.072) 
-1.925*** 
(8.668) 
-1.355*** 
(4.057) 
 1.103*** 
(3.619) 
-0.266 
(0.784) 
-1.737*** 
(5.043) 
0.478 
(0.915) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,603 9,090 9,708 9,423  2,396 2,275 2,427 2,352 
R
2
 0.318 0.096 0.233 0.306  0.297 0.091 0.203 0.282 
F Statistic 
(p-value) 
104.515 
(0.000) 
12.616 
(0.000) 
41.551 
(0.000) 
77.924 
(0.000) 
 44.259 
(0.000) 
8.757 
(0.000) 
34.688 
(0.000) 
32.021 
(0.000) 
Notes: TD/(EE+TD) is defined as total debt divided by external equity plus total debt. Total debt is the sum of short term debt and long term debt. External equity is defined 
as market value of equity less retained earnings. STD/(RE+STD) is defined as short term debt divided by retained earnings plus short term debt. LTD/TD is the ratio of long 
term debt divided by total debt. LTD/(EE+LTD) is defined as long term debt divided by external equity plus long term debt. Refer to table 2 for description of independent 
variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in firms and heteroskedastic robust variance estimators. t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 9 – 2sls regression results of the financing sources. 
 
Explanatory variables 
TD/(EE+TD)  
(1) 
STD/(RE+STD)  
(2) 
LTD/TD 
(3) 
LTD/(EE+LTD) 
(4) 
% independent
a
 -0.520*** 
(13.227) 
0.410*** 
(7.209) 
0.505*** 
(10.971) 
-0.290*** 
(4.665) 
Sales Growth -0.342*** 
(4.738) 
0.397*** 
(4.559) 
-0.037 
(0.453) 
-0.464*** 
(3.894) 
R&D to assets -3.075*** 
(9.573) 
-0.711 
(1.498) 
-1.211*** 
(3.638) 
-4.368*** 
(8.574) 
Tax rate -0.079* 
(1.944) 
0.205*** 
(3.381) 
0.069* 
(1.676) 
0.008 
(0.128) 
Log(Sales) 0.087*** 
(10.160) 
0.024*** 
(3.078) 
0.089*** 
(12.644) 
0.172*** 
(13.971) 
Depreciation to assets -0.451 
(1.147) 
2.216*** 
(4.004) 
2.282*** 
(5.113) 
1.149* 
(1.876) 
Tangibility 0.596*** 
(8.889) 
-0.462*** 
(6.258) 
0.957*** 
(15.622) 
1.376*** 
(13.887) 
Return on assets (ROA) -1.960*** 
(8.930) 
-1.984*** 
(9.352) 
-1.401*** 
(6.535) 
-3.602*** 
(10.254) 
Sigma (ROA) -0.037*** 
(10.749) 
-0.018*** 
(3.804) 
-0.014*** 
(3.637) 
-0.058*** 
(10.124) 
Log(Market cap to GDP ratio) -0.305*** 
(14.203) 
-0.043 
(1.137) 
-0.139*** 
(4.005) 
-0.487*** 
(11.777) 
Legal rights indicator 0.034*** 
(4.281) 
-0.002 
(0.229) 
0.080*** 
(6.456) 
0.103*** 
(6.567) 
Constant 0.145 
(1.362) 
-0.794*** 
(5.231) 
-1.956*** 
(12.881) 
-1.026*** 
(5.497) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,189 4,535 4,854 7,032 
2 
(p-value) 
3230.558 
(0.000) 
409.059 
(0.000) 
1552.785 
(0.000) 
2333.000 
(0.000) 
Wooldridge’s 2 
(p-value) 
1.08575 
(0.2974) 
2.4408 
(0.1182) 
0.001933 
(0.9649) 
0.00157 
(0.9684) 
Sargan 2 
(p-value) 
0.044796 
(0.8324) 
0.00042 
(0.9837) 
0.955277 
(0.3284) 
0.100666 
(0.7510) 
Partial R
2
 0.9243 0.8881 0.8855 0.9236 
Notes: TD/(EE+TD) is defined as total debt divided by external equity plus total debt. Total debt is the 
sum of short term debt and long term debt. External equity is defined as market value of equity less 
retained earnings. STD/(RE+STD) is defined as short term debt divided by retained earnings plus short 
term debt. LTD/TD is the ratio of long term debt divided by total debt. LTD/(EE+LTD) is defined as long 
term debt divided by external equity plus long term debt. Refer to table 2 for description of independent 
variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in firms and heteroskedastic robust variance estimators. 
z statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
a
instrumented with the lagged values.  
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Table 10 – Cross section regressions results of financing sources. 
 
Year % ind. Growth R&D TAX Sales DEP TANG ROA 
Sigma 
(ROA) 
MC to 
GDP 
LR Const. R
2
 
Panel A: Regression results of the fraction between total debt and total debt plus equity [TD/(EE+TD)] 
2006 -0.397*** 
(3.754) 
-0.879*** 
(3.556) 
-4.638** 
(2.257) 
-0.128 
(0.779) 
0.188*** 
(8.947) 
-1.440 
(1.265) 
1.624*** 
(9.527) 
-2.967*** 
(5.408) 
-0.071*** 
(5.731) 
-0.812*** 
(5.469) 
0.149*** 
(4.391) 
-0.141 
(0.258) 
0.353 
2007 -0.374*** 
(3.772) 
-0.806*** 
(3.418) 
-4.707*** 
(4.185) 
0.064 
(0.416) 
0.182*** 
(8.872) 
-0.607 
(0.372) 
1.632*** 
(9.454) 
-3.674*** 
(7.120) 
-0.060*** 
(5.640) 
-0.801*** 
(6.964) 
0.154*** 
(5.529) 
-0.108 
(0.232) 
0.366 
2008 -0.137 
(1.308) 
-0.462** 
(2.151) 
-3.571*** 
(3.604) 
0.022 
(0.223) 
0.152*** 
(7.602) 
0.152*** 
(7.602) 
1.315*** 
(8.367) 
-2.834*** 
(4.934) 
-0.050*** 
(4.672) 
-0.420*** 
(5.179) 
0.103*** 
(3.616) 
-1.306*** 
(3.831) 
0.265 
2009 -0.308*** 
(2.930) 
-0.500*** 
(2.779) 
-4.626*** 
(5.223) 
0.034 
(0.317) 
0.160*** 
(7.342) 
-0.125 
(0.120) 
1.448*** 
(8.056) 
-3.942*** 
(5.931) 
-0.066*** 
(7.060) 
-0.487*** 
(6.929) 
0.104*** 
(3.772) 
-0.996*** 
(3.164) 
0.324 
2010 -0.406*** 
(4.006) 
-0.412* 
(1.908) 
-5.284*** 
(6.063) 
-0.022 
(0.167) 
0.203*** 
(8.941) 
1.937 
(1.586) 
1.323*** 
(7.372) 
-4.458*** 
(7.536) 
-0.057*** 
(6.472) 
-0.448*** 
(7.083) 
0.085*** 
(3.423) 
-1.285*** 
(3.935) 
0.349 
Panel B: Regression results of the fraction between short term debt and retained earnings plus short term debt [STD/(RE+STD)] 
2006 0.311*** 
(4.527) 
0.321** 
(2.236) 
-0.738* 
(1.751) 
0.219** 
(2.052) 
0.009 
(0.868) 
0.511 
(0.875) 
-0.367*** 
(3.390) 
-1.336*** 
(4.769) 
-0.008 
(1.052) 
-0.128* 
(1.797) 
0.018 
(1.212) 
-0.428 
(1.439) 
0.079 
2007 0.179*** 
(2.627) 
0.496*** 
(3.347) 
-0.185 
(0.306) 
0.353*** 
(3.789) 
0.023** 
(2.099) 
0.533 
(0.614) 
-0.500*** 
(4.641) 
-0.845*** 
(3.270) 
-0.020*** 
(3.125) 
0.089 
(1.468) 
-0.004 
(0.350) 
-1.403*** 
(4.867) 
0.078 
2008 0.444*** 
(5.837) 
0.166 
(0.912) 
-1.405** 
(2.374) 
0.297*** 
(4.043) 
0.041*** 
(3.743) 
1.387* 
(1.798) 
-0.492*** 
(4.333) 
-1.167*** 
(3.391) 
-0.018** 
(2.183) 
-0.153*** 
(2.640) 
0.005 
(0.371) 
-0.554*** 
(2.595) 
0.101 
2009 0.454*** 
(5.970) 
0.371*** 
(3.196) 
-0.595 
(0.878) 
0.160** 
(2.054) 
0.015 
(1.339) 
2.276*** 
(3.044) 
-0.532*** 
(5.098) 
-1.845*** 
(6.754) 
-0.024*** 
(3.257) 
-0.075 
(1.317) 
-0.007 
(0.494) 
-0.524** 
(2.357) 
0.102 
2010 0.310*** 
(4.104) 
0.417*** 
(3.268) 
-0.829 
(1.244) 
0.262*** 
(2.697) 
0.034*** 
(3.178) 
2.164*** 
(2.631) 
-0.396*** 
(3.778) 
-2.141*** 
(6.530) 
-0.013** 
(2.019) 
-0.075 
(1.317) 
0.005 
(0.346) 
-1.082*** 
(5.298) 
0.102 
Panel C: Regression results of the fraction between long term debt and total debt [LTD/TD] 
2006 0.242*** 
(3.772) 
-0.194 
(1.406) 
-1.611 
(1.422) 
-0.011 
(0.136) 
0.086*** 
(8.009) 
0.558 
(0.558) 
1.024*** 
(9.352) 
-0.822*** 
(3.645) 
-0.019*** 
(3.681) 
-0.208** 
(2.137) 
0.114*** 
(4.430) 
-1.669*** 
(4.726) 
0.217 
2007 0.519*** 
(8.978) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.974 
(1.512) 
0.040 
(0.511) 
0.074*** 
(7.327) 
0.514 
(0.385) 
1.093*** 
(10.953) 
-1.093*** 
(4.357) 
-0.013** 
(2.256) 
-0.379*** 
(4.905) 
0.127*** 
(6.458) 
-1.030*** 
(3.464) 
0.261 
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2008 0.441*** 
(7.091) 
0.056 
(0.502) 
-0.760 
(1.394) 
0.060 
(1.099) 
0.082*** 
(8.402) 
1.645*** 
(3.060) 
1.006*** 
(12.000) 
-1.071*** 
(3.254) 
-0.018*** 
(3.394) 
-0.172*** 
(3.099) 
0.106*** 
(5.248) 
-2.046*** 
(9.946) 
0.235 
2009 0.506*** 
(8.419) 
0.039 
(0.389) 
-1.257*** 
(2.745) 
0.119** 
(2.228) 
0.085*** 
(9.464) 
1.896*** 
(3.473) 
0.991*** 
(11.161) 
-1.415*** 
(5.023) 
-0.013*** 
(2.612) 
-0.136*** 
(2.799) 
0.088*** 
(4.667) 
-2.033*** 
(10.323) 
0.251 
2010 0.507*** 
(8.103) 
-0.117 
(0.903) 
-1.174** 
(2.546) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
0.092*** 
(8.534) 
2.844*** 
(3.831) 
0.916*** 
(10.874) 
-1.393*** 
(4.353) 
-0.015*** 
(2.584) 
-0.143*** 
(2.929) 
0.072*** 
(4.552) 
-1.860*** 
(7.996) 
0.262 
Panel D: Regression results of the fraction between long term debt and external equity plus long term debt [LTD/(EE+LTD)] 
2006 -0.397*** 
(3.754) 
-0.879*** 
(3.556) 
-4.638** 
(2.257) 
-0.128 
(0.779) 
0.188*** 
(8.947) 
-1.440 
(1.265) 
1.624*** 
(9.527) 
-2.967*** 
(5.408) 
-0.071*** 
(5.731) 
-0.812*** 
(5.469) 
0.149*** 
(4.391) 
-0.141 
(0.258) 
0.353 
2007 -0.374*** 
(3.772) 
-0.806*** 
(3.418) 
-4.707*** 
(4.185) 
0.064 
(0.416) 
0.182*** 
(8.872) 
-0.607 
(0.372) 
1.632*** 
(9.454) 
-3.674*** 
(7.120) 
-0.060*** 
(5.640) 
-0.801*** 
(6.964) 
0.154*** 
(5.529) 
-0.108 
(0.232) 
0.366 
2008 -0.137 
(1.308) 
-0.462** 
(2.151) 
-3.571*** 
(3.604) 
0.022 
(0.223) 
0.152*** 
(7.602) 
1.965** 
(2.146) 
1.315*** 
(8.367) 
-2.834*** 
(4.934) 
-0.050*** 
(4.672) 
-0.420*** 
(5.179) 
0.103*** 
(3.616) 
-1.306*** 
(3.831) 
0.265 
2009 -0.308*** 
(2.930) 
-0.500*** 
(2.779) 
-4.626*** 
(5.223) 
0.034 
(0.317) 
0.160*** 
(7.342) 
-0.125 
(0.120) 
1.448*** 
(8.056) 
-3.942*** 
(5.931) 
-0.066*** 
(7.060) 
-0.487*** 
(6.929) 
0.104*** 
(3.772) 
-0.996*** 
(3.164) 
0.324 
2010 -0.406*** 
(4.006) 
-0.412* 
(1.908) 
-5.284*** 
(6.063) 
-0.022 
(0.167) 
0.203*** 
(8.941) 
1.937 
(1.586) 
1.323*** 
(7.372) 
-4.458*** 
(7.536) 
-0.057*** 
(6.472) 
-0.448*** 
(7.083) 
0.085*** 
(3.423) 
-1.285*** 
(3.935) 
0.349 
Notes: TD/(EE+TD) is defined as total debt divided by external equity plus total debt. Total debt is the sum of short term debt and long term debt. External equity is defined 
as market value of equity less retained earnings. STD/(RE+STD) is defined as short term debt divided by retained earnings plus short term debt. LTD/TD is the ratio of long 
term debt divided by total debt. LTD/(EE+LTD) is defined as long term debt divided by external equity plus long term debt. Refer to table 2 for description of independent 
variables. Heteroskedastic robust t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
